Statement of Theodore J. St. Antoine Before the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations by St. Antoine, Theodore J
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 
April 1994 
Statement of Theodore J. St. Antoine Before the Commission on 
the Future of Worker-Management Relations 
Theodore J. St. Antoine 
University of Michigan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Statement is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Statement of Theodore J. St. Antoine Before the Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
St. Antoine, T. J. (1994). Statement of Theodore J. St. Antoine before the Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Industrial and 
Labor Relations site: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/378/ 
This statement is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/378 
MARTIN P. CATHERWOOD LIBRAE » ^ W c V)o^< 
HEW YORK STATE S » 
WDUSTRIM. AMD UBOR RELWMWR 
Cornell University R e v i s e d 
STATEMENT OF THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE 
JAMES E. AND SARAH A. DEGAN PROFESSOR OF LAW 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
BEFORE 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
April 6, 1994 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission: My name is 
Theodore J. St. Antoine. I am a Professor of Law at the 
University of Michigan, where I have taught labor and employment 
law since 1965. For the past twenty years I have been a parttime 
labor arbitrator. I have also served on the Board of Governors 
of the National Academy of Arbitrators and as a reporter for the 
Uniform Law Commissioners' Drafting Committee on the Uniform 
Employment Termination Act. 
Your Commission has an opportunity to provide the framework 
for what could be the most significant changes in the federal law 
regulating the workplace since the passage of the Wagner Act in 
1935. I am deeply appreciative of the invitation to present my 
views to you on the use of alternative dispute resolution 
procedures. I beg your indulgence in permitting me first to say 
a few words on the one aspect of that subject about which I have 
experience that is unique among the distinguished group of 
witnesses you have assembled for today's hearing. That is the 
proposal for legislation, like the Model Employment Termination 
Act, to prohibit the wrongful discharge of employees. 
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In my opinion, the most important development in the whole 
field of labor and employment law during the past couple of 
decades did not occur at the federal level. It was the movement 
in the state courts of some 45 jurisdictions to modify the once 
universal doctrine of employment at will. As bluntly expressed 
by one nineteenth century American court, that meant employers 
could "dismiss their employees at will . . . for good cause, for 
no cause or even for cause morally wrong." Payne v. Western & 
Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). Workers could be 
fired for refusing to engage in illegal price-fixing, for serving 
on a jury, or for espousing political positions contrary to those 
of management. 
At-will employment remains a substantial practical problem 
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today. Professor Jack Stieber of Michigan State University 
calculates that there are 60 million at-will employees in the 
United States, of whom about two million are fired annually. Of 
these, Stieber believes 150,000 or more would have valid causes 
of action if they had the same "just cause" rights afforded 
nearly all union workers under collective bargaining agreements. 
Stieber, "Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will," 36 Labor 
Law Journal 557, 558 (1985). 
The state courts have used three principal theories to 
modify employment at will. Each has serious deficiencies for 
employees and employers alike. The first is the public policy 
exception. But that takes an egregious violation, such as 
discharging an employee for refusing to commit a crime. 
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Relatively few employees will find that modification useful. 
Second is the contract exception. An employer may be held 
liable for an arbitrary dismissal if it has included a guarantee 
of no discipline except for good cause in an employee handbook. 
But an employer can avoid that restriction by simply refraining 
from any such assurances, or even by excising any existing 
protections from personnel manuals with adequate advance notice. 
The third and potentially most expansive theory, the notion 
that every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, has doctrinal infirmities and has been accepted 
by only a handful of states. 
Finally, the employees who win in court are rarely rank-and-
file workers. Only professional and managerial employees are 
likely to have large enough claims to attract the attention of 
lawyers operating on the basis of contingent fees. 
On the other hand, when an employer becomes enmeshed in a 
common-law wrongful discharge action, the results can be a heavy 
financial blow. Several studies of California cases showed that 
a plaintiff employee who can get to a jury will win about 75 
percent of the time, with the average award around $450,000. 
Multimillion dollar verdicts for single individuals are not 
uncommon. 
Even the successful defense of a jury case may cost $100,000 
to $200,000. And two years ago a RAND study estimated that the 
"hidden costs" of the common-law regime—for example, keeping on 
inefficient employees out of a fear of expensive lawsuits—amount 
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to 100 times as much as the court judgments and other legal 
expenses. 
Remedial legislation is needed for the benefit of everyone, 
employers as well as employees. In August 1991 the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted, by the 
resounding vote of 39 state delegations to 11, the Model 
Employment Termination Act (META). 
I had the privilege of serving as "reporter," or principal 
draftsperson, for the Commissioners' drafting committee, and so I 
may have some bias in favor of our final product. At the 
distance of almost three years, however, I still consider it a 
fair and balanced compromise of the competing worthy interests of 
workers and management. I have submitted an official copy of the 
text of the Act, with accompanying commentary, for inclusion in 
the Commission's records. 
META prohibits the dismissal of most full-time employees 
(those working 20 or more hours a week) after one year of service 
unless there is "good cause." Good cause is essentially the same 
familiar standard that appears in most collective bargaining 
agreements and has been applied in tens of thousands of 
arbitrations over the past half century. 
The preferred method of enforcing META is through the use of 
professional arbitrators. The remedies are similar to those 
under the National Labor Relations Act and the original 1964 
Civil Rights Act, namely, reinstatement with or without back pay. 
General compensatory and punitive damages are expressly excluded. 
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There is also a displacement or extinguishment of common-law tort 
or implied contract actions based on an employee's termination. 
The result of this sophisticated scheme is a sensible trade-
off. Employees are guaranteed certain irreducible substantive 
rights. In return employers are relieved of the risk of crushing 
legal liability. Both sides are provided procedures that should 
be simpler, faster, and cheaper than the current jury system. 
Despite its overwhelming endorsement by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners, META faces formidable barriers to enactment. One 
of the most troublesome is the fear of the various states that 
adoption would place a state at a competitive disadvantage in 
relation to other states. I believe that worry is misguided but 
it is very real. The solution, as is so often the case in the 
labor field, would be the passage of a federal statute like META 
covering the entire country. 
A federal law could also eliminate an employer objection to 
wrongful discharge legislation which I feel has considerable 
merit. That is the proliferation of tribunals and the subjection 
of employers to a series of actions in several different forums. 
We have tried to minimize this difficulty in META by providing 
that principles of res judicata apply whenever possible. But of 
course state law cannot control federal law and separate federal 
actions. 
I urge the Commission to think boldly about the problem of 
multiple forums. Perhaps it is time to replace the National 
Labor Relations Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
5 
Commission with a single National Employment Relations Board. 
This restructured agency could have jurisdiction not only over 
antiunion discrimination, but also over "status" discrimination 
on the basis of race, sex, age, disability, etc., and finally 
over terminations without good cause. To handle the increased 
caseload, the new Board might operate through regional panels, 
with discretionary review by a centralized body to resolve any 
conflicts that may develop at the local level. 
All those are procedural questions that deserve much further 
airing. But on the central substantive issue, the right of 
employees not to be terminated without good cause, the United 
States is out of step with every other major industrial democracy 
in the world. Some 60 countries, including all our leading 
international competitors, have heeded the call of the 
International Labor Organization for the legal protection of 
workers' jobs. 
A few persons persist in arguing that at-will employment is 
justified by freedom of contract. Anyone familiar with the 
realities of the industrial world knows there is rarely equality 
of bargaining power between the corporate employer and the 
solitary employee. The severance of any single employment 
relationship is usually far more damaging to the employee than to 
the company. 
Besides the economic deprivation, numerous studies document 
the devastating psychological injury and snrial disruption 
suffered by a worker and a worker's family when a job is lost. 
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In my judgment, the requirement of good cause for dismissal has 
now become a moral and historical imperative. I strongly urge 
you to recommend that federal law include freedom from unjust 
discharge among the basic rights of American workers. 
Let me now turn to the use of voluntary, contractual 
arbitration, rather than statutorily imposed arbitration, as the 
means of enforcing substantive rights under such statutes as the 
various civil rights and antidiscrimination laws. Once again, my 
experience in the drafting of the Model Employment Termination 
Act is revealing. This country's regard for freedom of contract 
was reflected in the Uniform Law Commissioners' insistence that 
we permit employers and employees to opt out of the statutorily 
prescribed arbitration procedures and agree instead on private 
arbitration or other alternative mechanisms for resolving an 
employee's claim. Industrial relations specialists rightly tend 
to view freedom of contract with suspicion in the employment 
context because of the usual imbalance in bargaining power. 
Nonetheless, the natural appeal of the concept is almost 
irresistible, and that should be a factor in the Commission's 
deliberations. 
What is critical is that adequate procedural or "due 
process" safeguards be installed to ensure that statutory rights 
are not impaired by private adjudicators. That will probably 
also mean somewhat more searching judicial review than we are 
used to when only contract claims are at stake. The Model Act, 
for example, provides for vacation of an award if the arbitrator 
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commits a prejudicial error of law. I realize this creates the 
risk of diluting the finality that is one of the great virtues of 
arbitration as we have come to know it in the collective 
bargaining setting. But when sensitive individual rights under 
antidiscrimination and other protective legislation are involved, 
I doubt that the courts will remain aloof and let an arbitrator 
mangle an employee's claim. 
As we know, the Supreme Court has already sustained an 
individual brokerage employee's agreement to arbitrate a claim 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). But that 
holding was much more limited than some have supposed. It could 
mean no more than that the employee was obligated to exhaust 
private arbitral remedies before proceeding to court. It 
certainly gives no final answer to the guestion of the weight to 
be accorded the arbitration award once rendered, despite the 
distinction drawn between Gilmer and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In the latter, the Court held that an 
arbitrator's finding of "just cause" for a termination under a 
collective bargaining agareement did not preclude the discharged 
employee's seeking a de novo trial for alleged racial 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. 
Alexander should be modified and Gilmer extended to 
authorize the final and binding arbitration of statutory claims 
when that is provided for in either a collective bargaining 
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agreement or an individual employment contract. There would be 
need, of course, especially in the individual case, for close 
scrutiny to prevent any possible coercion, surprise, or other 
overreaching by a more powerful employer. Presumablly an 
amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1, would 
eliminate the long-standing doubts about the applicability of 
that statute to contracts of employment. 
My views on the desirability of an increasing resort to 
private arbitration for the resolution of statutory disputes, 
including civil rights issues, find confirmation in the words of 
such distinguished federal appellate judges as Alvin Rubin of the 
Fifth Circuit, Betty Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit, and Harry T. 
Edwards of the D.C. Circuit. Judge Rubin suggested that "some 
problems can best be resolved by giving a wider hand to 
collective bargaining and to resolution of disputes in 
arbitration.11 Rubin, "Arbitration: Toward a Rebirth," in Nat. 
Acad. Arbs., Proc. 31st Ann. Meeting 30, 36 (1979). Even more 
pointedly, Judge Fletcher declared that "arbitration . . . is the 
best forum for the grievant. . . . [Arbitrators have it within 
their power and their grasp to improve the process in order to 
accomplish the goals of Title VII." Fletcher, "Arbitration of 
Title VII Claims: Some Judicial Perceptions," in Nat. Acad. 
Arbs., Proc. 34th Ann. Meeting 218, 228 (1982). 
Perhaps most noteworthy of all are the observations of Judge 
Harry Edwards, because he was an active practitioner in labor law 
and an eminent labor scholar at both Michigan and Harvard before 
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ascending the bench, and because he formerly often expressed 
"grave reservations about arbitrators deciding public law 
issues." Edwards, "Advantages of Arbitration over Litigation: 
Reflections of a Judge," in Nat. Acad. Arbs., Proc. 35th Ann. 
Meeting 16, 27 (1983). On the basis of his exerience on the 
court, Judge Edwards changed his mind. Said he: "I believe that 
arbitration should be explored as a mechanism for the resolution 
of individual claims of discrimination in unorganized, as well as 
unionized, sectors of the employment market." Id. at 28 
(emphasis in the original). Like Judges Rubin and Fletcher, 
Judge Edwards stressed the speed and cost savings of arbitration 
as advantages over litigation in the resolving of disputes. The 
greater informality of arbitration can also be conducive to a 
lessening of employer-employee hostility, which is especially 
desirable in the event reinstatement is ultimately ordered. 
If private procedures like arbitration, agreed to by the 
employer and the employee, are to supersede the administrative or 
judicial procedures prescribed by a statute, there should be 
guarantees that customary "due process" standards are applicable. 
With some adaptation, section 101(a)(5) of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§4ll(a)(5), dealing with internal union disciplinary proceedings, 
can provide suitable guidelines. An employee, for example, would 
be entitled to written specific reasons for a termination, a 
reasonable opportunity to prepare a case, and a full and fair 
hearing. To help ensure the use of an impartial hearing officer, 
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the employee should have a genuine voice in the selection of that 
person. I also understand that the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service established certain minimum standards that 
had to be observed before it furnished arbitrators to employer-
sponsored arbitration systems. Those FMCS criteria merit 
examination. 
Next, there is the question of remedy. In traditional 
union-management arbitration, the accepted remedy is 
reinstatement, with or without back pay. Other damages, 
compensatory or punitive, are uncommon. Statutes permitting the 
use of alternative dispute resolution procedures might very well 
require that the arbitrator or other private adjudicator be 
authorized to furnish at least as full a remedy as the statute 
itself. Otherwise, the binding effect of the arbitrator's award 
could be limited to fact-finding, or the award could be given no 
more effect than under existing law. Another alternative would 
be to conclude that, on the facts of a given case, the union or 
the employee had deliberately agreed to limit the available 
remedies in return for other contract concessions by the 
employer. It's not easy to say whether that should be allowed. 
But my initial reaction is that the statutory remedy, like the 
substantive antidiscrimination prohibition itself, ought to be 
treated as an expression of public policy that could not be 
overridden by private agreement. 
I have a caveat to all this. In my judgment, the National 
Labor Relations Board has been too quick to conclude that it 
11 
should "defer" to arbitration when an individual employee files a 
charge alleging unlawful discrimination, just because the 
employee could have raised the issue under a contract grievance 
procedure. See, e.g., United Technologies Corp.. 268 N.L.R.B. 
557 (1984) , overruling General American Transportation Corp., 228 
N.L.R.B. 808 (1977). See also Charles B. Craver, "Labor 
Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective Bargaining 
Process," 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 571, 605-16 (1990). I do not see 
why a union's or an employee's obtaining of a new and arguably 
additional contractual right should necessarily deprive the 
employee of a preexisting statutory right. At least there should 
be an inquiry on a case-by-case basis as to the evidence of an 
intent to waive the procedures and remedies provided by the 
statute when adding the new contract protections. Similarly, 
here, I would not leap to the conclusion that a provision for 
contract arbitration automatically divests an employee of the 
option of recourse to the statute itself. 
To maintain uniformity of regulation in areas over which 
Congress has exercised authority, the Supreme Court has developed 
an elaborate preemption doctrine concerning the displacement of 
state law. Where preemption turns on the existence of section 
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act as the basis for enforcing contracts 
between unions and employers, the touchstone is apparently 
whether there has to be any significant interpretation of the 
labor contract in the course of entertaining the state law claim. 
Compare Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck. 471 U.S. 202 (1985), with 
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Linale v. Noroe Div. of Magic Chef. Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 
Only if the state claim can be considered wholly separate and 
apart from the contract, as in the case of an employee's action 
under the antiretaliation provision of a state workers' 
compensation statute, is preemption avoided. 
I agree with Professor Michael C. Harper that the Supreme 
Court has taken an overly simplistic view of contract preemption. 
Harper, "Limiting Section 301 Preemption: Three Cheers for the 
Trilogy, Only One for Lingle and Lueck," 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 685 
(1990). Why, for example, should a union employee be denied the 
benefit of a state law right merely because a collective 
agreement might have waived the right, and there would have to be 
resort to contract interpretation to make that determination? 
Harper would substitute the following test: there should be no 
preemption of a state law action that exists independently of a 
collective agreement and can proceed without reference to rights 
secured or duties imposed by that agreement. I would propose a 
parallel principle for individual contracts of employment 
governed by an amended Federal Arbitration Act. 
All of this has particular reference to the possibility of 
the states enacting the Model Employment Termination Act or some 
eguivalent "good cause" legislation. Organized labor is deeply 
concerned that the protections of such laws might not extend, 
because of the current preemption doctrine, to unionized 
employees or at least not to employees covered by union 
contracts. I myself would think that only the most mechanical 
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application of preemption precedent would produce such a perverse 
result. After all, the Supreme Court in the past has exhibited 
substantial deference to state laws dealing with employment 
discrimination, "minimum labor standards," and worker welfare 
generally. See, e.g. . Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. 
Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963); Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts. 471 U.S. 724 (1985); New York Tel. 
Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979). But 
cf. Barnes v. Stone Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 
1991). Indeed, I should think there could be constitutional 
questions presented if unionized workers wound up worse off than 
nonunion employees under state protective legislation, because 
they had exercised their rights under section 7 of the National 
Labor Relations Act to organize and bargain collectively. In any 
event, this is an issue that plainly calls for clarification. 
Even a generally salutary principle like federal preemption can 
be carried to mischievous extremes. 
I am convinced that private dispute-resolution procedures 
may have a significant role to play in making statutory rights 
more accessible to employees, at a saving to everyone of time, 
money, and psychic wear and tear. I hope my comments will be of 
help to you in realizing that potential. 
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